Modernisation has been rhetorically important for the Labour government since 1997, and it found a dedicated outlet through the House of Commons Modernisation Committee. This committee has pursued a particular type of modernisation, which this article seeks to explore. It does this by focusing on three issues. First, it examines the role of the Leader of the House of Commons in the chair of the Modernisation Committee. Second, it looks at the work of the Modernisation Committee in comparison to that of the Procedure Committee. Finally, it contextualises the discussion of modernisation with reference to the distinction between efficiency reforms and effectiveness reforms, and explores what this reveals about the complexity of executive-legislative relations at Westminster, and about the course of the modernisation debate since 1997.
Introduction
New Labour came to power in 1997 committed to a modernising agenda informed by its adherence to the so-called Third Way, and its promise of renewing social democracy (Giddens 1998 and Clift 2001 ). The discourse of the Third Way signified a 'reconfiguration of relationships between economy and state, public and private, government and people', in which 'modernisation was a label attached to a wide-range of institutional reforms, including those of government, party and the political process itself' (Newman 2001, 40) . Although there is much debate about the extent of Labour's 'newness' (Fielding 2003, 3-5) , Labour's commitment to modernisation and renewal was clear. What is more doubtful is the success enjoyed by the government in securing this modernisation. This is particularly relevant with respect to the party's pledges on constitutional change and modernisation.
Labour came to power with a broad set of proposals, most notably on devolution, freedom of information, human rights legislation, and the reform of parliament. However, since its election, the government has been criticised for not understanding how these reforms related to each other and impacted upon the Westminster model (Richards and Smith 2001, 164) , which has resulted in the failure to reform the constitution in the way that Labour originally promised (Flinders 2004, 126) .
This article seeks to examine the strand of the Labour government's modernisation programme directed towards the House of Commons. The select committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons was established within weeks of the Labour Party coming to power in 1997. Its task was 'to consider how the practices and procedures of the House should be modernised' (HC 190, 1997-98) . Attempts to enhance the procedural efficacy of the chamber have a long-standing pedigree, and procedural adaptation has been most pronounced in response to government complaints about the legislative obstacle course that is the House of Commons. Procedural changes stretch back to the 19 th century, culminating in the reforms secured in 1902, which involved substantial alterations to Commons procedure in order to increase the occasions on which government business took precedence (Redlich 1908, vol. 1; Chester 1977; Borthwick 1979) . Other notable moments of procedural modernisation include 1906-07 and 1945-46 , when procedure committees were appointed to bring forward proposals for ensuring the expeditious dispatch of government business (Redlich 1908, vol. 2; Morrison 1964; Walkland 1979; Seaward and Silk 2004), and 1978-79 , when the Procedure Committee recommended the creation of departmental select committees.
However, the creation of the Modernisation Committee in 1997 marked a new phase in the debate over House procedure, and there are three central issues that this article will explore.
First, the Modernisation Committee, although a select committee, is chaired by the Leader of the House of Commons. This role for the cabinet member who is also in charge of securing the government's legislative programme is a significant institutional innovation. Second, the Modernisation Committee has engaged with many of the issues that have in the past been the focus for the Procedure Committee, and the latter committee has, to a degree, been sidelined in the debate over procedural matters. Both these issues raise questions about who has been driving modernisation in the House of Commons and for what purposes. This leads to the third point, that in order to understand fully the nature of the Modernisation Committee and its work, it is necessary to make a distinction between 'modernisation' of the House, which is largely concerned with creating an efficient chamber, and 'reform' of the House, which is focused more upon creating an effective chamber. The distinction between these two terms has profound implications. The rhetoric and practice of modernisation since 1997 underlines the complex role of the House of Commons in terms of its relationship with the government.
The modernisation project also illuminates the imbalance in executive-legislative relations at
Westminster, and the ease with which government can use its position as the dominant actor at Westminster to secure changes that primarily serve its own purposes. Simultaneously, the analysis also highlights the complexity and subtlety of executive-legislative relations at
Westminster, which are not necessarily a zero-sum game. The pursuit of particular kinds of efficiency reform may contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of the chamber, and viceversa. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The two different perspectives on reform are nevertheless useful indicators of how different actors perceive the role and purpose of the House of Commons.
The Role of the Leader of the House
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Modernisation Committee has been the role of the Leader of the House of Commons as its chair, the minister who is charged with securing the government's legislative agenda (see Table 1 Committee looked at issues such as explanatory material for bills (HC 389, 1997-98) , conduct in the chamber (HC 600, 1997-98) and voting methods (HC 699, 1997-98; HC 779, 1997-98) . The committee also looked at expediting government business, and conducted an examination of the legislative process resulting in the initial recommendations for legislative programming (HC 190, 1997-98) . Taylor also oversaw the publication of a report aimed at improving Commons scrutiny of European legislation (HC 791, 1997-98 Taylor herself accepted that the legislative reforms she had introduced were 'not exactly earth shattering ' (Hansard, col. 1065 , 13 November 1997 .
Margaret Beckett prioritised the interests of government well above those of the House of Commons in her approach to modernisation. Margaret Beckett was in the chair of the Modernisation Committee during its most divided periods, when it looked at sitting-hours changes (HC 60, 1998-99; HC 719, 1998-99; HC 954, 1999 HC 954, -2000 and at legislative programming (HC 589, 1999 (HC 589, -2000 HC 382, 2000-01 (HC 465, 2004-05) and examined broader issues, such as the way in which parliament connects and communicates with the public (HC 368, 2003-04) . He attempted to resolve the question of The preoccupation of the Modernisation Committee with sitting hours and legislative programming illustrates that the modernisation process has not only been geared towards the interests of government, but has also largely been driven by it. This is brought into further relief when the work of the Modernisation Committee since 1997 is contrasted with that of the Procedure Committee before 1997.
The Circumvention of the Procedure Committee
The Modernisation Committee has essentially usurped many of the functions of the Commons Procedure Committee. The terms of reference of both committees are remarkably similar. The Procedure Committee is instructed 'to consider the practice and procedure of the House in the conduct of public business, and to make recommendations' (HC 325, 2003-04) .
The Modernisation Committee is instructed 'to consider how the practice and procedures of the House should be modernised, and to make recommendations' (HC 190, 1997-98) . The terms of reference of the Procedure Committee do not specifically use the term 'modernisation', but modernisation has frequently been the aim of many of its proposals since at least the 1960s. Furthermore, the Procedure Committee has previously examined many of the issues the Modernisation Committee has focused on since 1997.
For example, the Procedure Committee has examined the possibility of changing the sitting hours of the House and the parliamentary calendar on a number of occasions over the past four decades (HC 153, 1966-67; HC 356, 1967-68; HC 491, 1974-75; HC 588, 1977-78; HC 157, 1986-87) . The appointment of the committee on Sittings of the House (the Jopling Committee) in the early 1990s demonstrates that the Procedure Committee's recommendations have not always been implemented (although the Jopling Committee hardly fared any better, as the House took over two years to adopt only a select few of its proposals (Seaward and Silk 2004,150) ). The Procedure Committee has also examined the legislative process (HC 538, 1970-71; HC 49, 1984-85) . The latter of these two reports examined the case for legislative programming, recommending that the House establish a legislative business committee to introduce timetables for bills. Both government and opposition were hostile to this proposal, because it placed power into the hands of parliamentarians rather than the usual channels. Their thwarting of this plan provoked much criticism from the committee (HC 324, 1985-86) . Its approach to these and other matters has arguably been somewhat haphazard and irregular, particularly in comparison with that of the Modernisation Committee, which has repeatedly returned to these issues to forge a way forward. Clearly, having the Leader of the House at the helm of the Modernisation Committee has helped ensure that such matters are not abandoned in the face of House disagreement.
The Procedure Committee was also intimately involved with the establishment of the departmental select committee system in 1979 (HC 588, 1977-78) . Its assessment of those committees in 1990 (HC 19, 1989-90) concluded that the system generally was working well, although the effectiveness of the committees, as defined by the Procedure Committee, has been questioned (Judge 1992 
The Values Underpinning the Modernisation Project
The role of the Leader of the House inside the Modernisation Committee, coupled with the evidence that the Committee has assumed pre-eminence over several important issues that had previously been the preserve of the Procedure Committee, demonstrates that government has been driving the modernisation project since 1997. However, the definition of modernisation, and its supposed purposes, has been contested. The terms of reference of the Modernisation Committee, noted earlier, are rather vague on the aims of modernisation. The first report from the committee indicated that it had been appointed 'to consider how the practices and procedures of the House should be modernised' (HC 190, 1997-98 ), but did not attempt to explore the meaning of the term 'modernisation' in any detail. A subsequent report went somewhat further, indicating that the aim of modernisation was to enable 'the House and its Members to work more effectively and more efficiently' (HC 600, 1997-98, para. 1). However, the Modernisation Committee has failed to acknowledge the important distinctions to be made between these two goals of effectiveness and efficiency. It is a distinction that goes directly to the heart of the modernisation debate. However, a March 1998 report from the Modernisation Committee also indicated its intention to examine potential improvements to the effectiveness of the House (HC 600 1997-98; para. 1). As Tony Wright noted, efficiency improvements 'are important matters' but they do not 'go to the heart of the constitutional issue' surrounding the drift of power away from parliament and towards the executive (Hansard, cols 685-686, 14 May 2002) . This does not mean that the two types of reform cannot proceed together. However, the different emphases do suggest that a desire to enhance the efficiency of the Commons might mitigate the extent to which one might also wish to improve the effectiveness of the Commons. Indeed, the extent to which the term 'modernisation' is itself synonymous with the goals of efficiency reforms raises questions about whether the remit of the Modernisation Committee includes the kind of effectiveness reforms outlined here.
That there is a tension between the efficiency and effectiveness dimensions of reform is evidenced in the work undertaken by the Modernisation Committee. Most of the committee's proposals have focused on the efficiency dimension of reform, with substantially less attention paid to the goal of securing a more effective House of Commons. Table 2 places each report from the Modernisation Committee under the heading of effectiveness or efficiency, respectively, as those terms have been defined here. In the absence of space to discuss each report in detail, the remainder of the article will focus on a few key examples.
Exploration of the progress of sitting-hours changes and the securing of legislative programming in particular underlines how divisive these issues have been and the partisan responses that they have provoked. 
Expediting Government Business: Legislative Programming
Of all the efficiency reforms proposed by the Modernisation Committee, perhaps none has provoked more criticism than has legislative programming. Programming mechanisms have been advocated by reformers on the basis that they give more structure and predictability to legislative scrutiny. The committee's first report recommended the adoption of legislative programming as a means to increase the expeditious dispatch of government business (HC 190, 1997-98, paras 57-66) . The committee admitted that the issue was 'emotive and contentious', and that there would always be 'political considerations' involved in the handling of bills (paras 57-58). However, the report maintained that a way could be found between the informal usual channels and the more rigid guillotine. The concept of legislative programming certainly had precedents, most notably in a Hansard Society report on the legislative process (Hansard Society 1993) and in Procedure Committee recommendations for a business committee (HC 49, 1984-85) , and it also formed part of the 1992 Jopling
Committee proposals (HC 20, 1991-92 ). Yet, the Modernisation Committee rejected these approaches as inflexible, favouring instead the use of programme motions negotiated through the usual channels, and ultimately set by government (HC 190, 1997-98, para. 89 ).
Modernisation Committee proposals on legislative programming, and subsequent Commons debates on the matter, have revealed deep disagreements regarding the way that programming operates and the motives of the committee in supporting it. Although Commons debates illustrate that there was initially cautious cross-party support for the principle of programming (Hansard, 13 November 1997; 9 March 1998), the way that programming has functioned in practice has caused much of that support to seep away.
The committee's report of July 2000 (HC 589, 1999 (HC 589, -2000 , which outlined suggestions for improving and expanding legislative programming, did not enjoy unanimous support from the committee members. Conservative member Sir George Young proposed a dissenting report, which argued that the programming motions 'make it yet easier for Government to get its legislative programme through the House and, in so doing, lessen rather than encourage proper and adequate scrutiny' (HC 589, 1999 (HC 589, -2000 The process of adopting legislative programming highlights the complexities of the relationship between the government and the House of Commons, and the degree of partisanship that surfaces when controversial issues such as these are promoted as being beneficial to parliament. As it is the Leader of the House who is in charge of securing the government's legislative programme, he or she also has a stake in consolidating a system of legislative programming that ensures bills emerge from the legislative process at specific, and pre-arranged times, thus restricting the scope for opposition and delay, an approach which was supported by most Labour MPs. By contrast, and not surprisingly, opposition members consistently argued, both inside the Modernisation Committee and in the chamber, that it was a fundamental duty of the Commons, through the opposition, to impose a degree of delay on bills, and that the government could not assume it should always secure its legislation with minimal interference from the House.
The Effectiveness of the House of Commons: Select Committee Reform
The Modernisation Committee has spent most of its time looking at issues of procedural efficiency, and effectiveness matters have received limited attention as a result. Only three reports have looked exclusively at enhancing Commons capabilities in terms of executive scrutiny. Two reports have examined scrutiny of European business (HC 719, 1997-98; HC 465, 2004-05) , an area that arguably requires much more attention. However, the most notable work done by the Modernisation Committee with regards to scrutiny is that concerning the select committee system.
The 2002 attempt to reform the select committee system has been examined elsewhere (Kelso 2003) , but the most salient point to note is that the Modernisation Committee was reluctant to recognise the need for alterations to the operation of the select committees. Formed in 1978, the select committee system was a significant step forward for parliamentary scrutiny and
House of Commons effectiveness, but had nevertheless been a focus for reformers who argued that the system needs additional, perhaps even constant, revision. The Modernisation
Committee only engaged with the issue after considerable attention had been brought to bear on the matter by other actors. The Liaison Committee was perhaps most vocal in its concerns, publishing a number of reports that highlighted the deficiencies of the select committee system in terms of scrutiny (HC 300, 1999 (HC 300, -2000 HC 748, 1999 HC 748, -2000 HC 321 2000-01) .
The serious problems facing the select committees were further underlined following the rejection by backbenchers in July 2001 of the government's attempts to remove two select committee chairs, Donald Anderson and Gwyneth Dunwoody (Kelso 2003, 58-62) . It is fortuitous that criticism of the existing system came to a head just as Robin Cook was appointed Leader of the House. His arrival in the chair of the Modernisation Committee enabled a window of opportunity to open in favour of reform (Norton 2000; Kelso 2003) , and the committee's eventual proposals to reform the select committee system (HC 224, 2001-02) attempted to tackle some of the issues that were at the heart of the imbalance in executivelegislative relations, particularly those recommendations geared towards removing whip influence from select committee nominations, which had long been criticised for delimiting the scrutiny abilities of the select committees (Kelso 2003, 62-63 However, despite the Commons having the opportunity to engage with reform that would make a significant difference to its scrutiny capabilities, the House did not possess the political will to secure that reform. While a number of the proposals were accepted by the Commons in May 2002, such as core duties for select committees, the most important aspects of the reform package were defeated, such as those aimed at removing whip influence from the committee selection process (Kelso 2003, 62-66) . Reformist arguments failed to sway those MPs who were persuaded by the whips that existing arrangements were best preserved (Kelso 2003, 64-66) . Of course, core duties for select committees and payment for committee chairmen may contribute to enhanced scrutiny. However, these reforms were underpinned by the notion that the executive should not make decisions about who scrutinises it. So long as the whips play a central role in choosing those MPs who serve on select committees, the real effectiveness of these other reforms will be constrained. As one Liberal Democrat MP explained, if chairmen are paid while the committee selection process is still controlled by the whips, then it is possible that such positions can be used as 'sweeteners' to place compliant or Table 2 demonstrates that, even through the crude measure of number of reports, much of the Modernisation Committee's time has been spent on efficiency issues. The categorisation of some modernisation issues may be debatable, perhaps none more so than the Westminster Hall sitting proposal. This was a measure promoted on the basis that it would 'enable the House to hold the government to account on a wider range of issues' (HC 194, 1998-99, para. 23 ). Westminster Hall sittings were geared towards offering a forum for those issues that did not always find time on the floor of the House of Commons, and in terms of the scrutiny that it was designed to facilitate, it is tempting to suggest that Westminster Hall is a clear effectiveness reform. Indeed, if the Hall enables more debate and discussion of important issues, and provides time to look at select committee reports and issues of backbench concern, then this can only result in more scrutiny, which is an obvious effectiveness gain. However, it is not only the existence of the scrutiny that is important, but also the context in which it takes place. The deliberately non-controversial institutional setting of Westminster Hall means it holds rather less attraction for MPs than the main chamber, where partisan debate can more usefully aid one's parliamentary career, thus reducing the impact of the scrutiny that takes place in the Hall. Effectiveness is therefore about the quality of scrutiny, not necessarily the quantity. Westminster Hall is not a scrutiny mechanism on par with the select committee system, not least on account of the lack of publicity that it receives, and it is therefore unclear whether it fulfils its original purpose of holding government to account on a wider range of issues. Thus far, Westminster Hall may simply have served to prevent further demands arising for scrutiny opportunities on the floor of the House of Commons, rendering it an inadvertent efficiency reform, rather than an effectiveness reform.
The Marginalisation of Reform
However, this article has maintained that these two categories are not mutually exclusive, and that changes can be both efficient and effective. Other reports in Table 2 do seem to fall into both categories. For example, the proposal to carry over bills from one session to the next can deliver both efficiency and effectiveness gains: the government may be more likely to introduce bills later in the session knowing they can be carried over to the next, rather than lost, and the Commons can conduct better scrutiny because the mechanism works against there being a glut of legislation at one point in the session. Explanatory material for bills also seems to fall into both categories: with the content of legislation more clearly explained, parliament may be able to deal with it more quickly and in better possession of the facts about the nature of the bills before it. However, when these are underpinned by legislative programming, it becomes clear that they tip rather more towards the efficiency classification, while still deriving effectiveness gains of some kind. Both consequently deliver far more benefits in terms of streamlining and expediting than they do for House effectiveness. More importantly, neither proposal is on par with those kinds of reforms designed to rebalance significantly executive-legislative relations at Westminster.
Pre-legislative scrutiny is another example of a reform that has potential benefits in terms of both House efficiency and House effectiveness, helping government to draft better legislation that may be more acceptable to parliament, and facilitating parliamentary scrutiny at an earlier stage of the legislative process. This was a mechanism to which the Modernisation Committee pledged its commitment early on (HC 190, 1997-98, para. 20) , although no single report ever dealt exclusively with this matter. Pre-legislative scrutiny is valuable, but its introduction has not been an unqualified success. It has been described as lacking structure (Blackburn and Kennon 2003, 727) , and the Liaison Committee in particular has drawn attention to several impediments to its effectiveness (HC 419, 2004-05, para. 20) . The efficiency and effectiveness benefits of pre-legislative scrutiny are constrained by the lack of a coherent plan as to how such scrutiny should fit into the wider work of the House and its various committees, and thus contribute to rebalancing executive-legislative relations at
Westminster. Indeed, it is the absence of a series of reform proposals that would cumulatively and systematically work towards such a rebalancing that means even those proposals that fall into both categories remain constrained in terms of what they can deliver by way of effectiveness gains. In 2006, the Modernisation Committee, first under the chairmanship of Geoff Hoon and then Jack Straw, resolved to examine once more the legislative process in its entirety, and to ascertain how legislative scrutiny could be better performed (HC 810, 2005-06) . The fact that this enquiry looked at those issues already explored almost a decade before, in the very first report from the Committee (HC 190, 1997-98) , is evidence of the difficulties the Committee has faced in securing reforms that can help enhance both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the House of Commons, particularly in the context of its focus on legislative programming in previous sessions.
Conclusion
The relative paucity of recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the House of Commons, particularly in terms of its ability to scrutinise the executive, reveals much about the driving force behind the Modernisation Committee. Its focus on sitting hours and on legislative programming indicates that the committee has been primarily concerned with securing an efficient House of Commons, which is as streamlined as possible, and which facilitates the expeditious dispatch of government business, both of which have clear benefits for the party in power. Moves towards both these conditions have not always been easy, and the contradictory interpretations held by MPs regarding the best sitting-hours arrangements have, at least for the time being, resulted in something of a compromise between early and late sittings of the House. In terms of legislative programming, however, there is no question that with the Modernisation Committee returning repeatedly to the issue, the government has secured a process that bestows a greater degree of certainty on to the legislative process.
Analysis of the emphasis of the modernisation project since 1997 demonstrates that, despite serious arguments about the need for a more effective House with enhanced scrutiny capabilities, change has not always been forthcoming. Criticism of the focus of the Modernisation Committee, coupled with the relatively few recommendations made to enhance House effectiveness, has led to reformers calling for measures that would improve the scrutiny of the executive. By contrast, the Modernisation Committee has been viewed largely as a creature of government, particularly given that it is chaired by the Leader of the House, and has therefore pursued a modernisation agenda that is seen as benefiting government objectives rather than contributing to enhanced scrutiny of the government by the House of Commons. The nature of the sitting-hours changes, and particularly the nature of legislative programming, illustrate that the Modernisation Committee exists to shape House procedures so that they are of most benefit to the government, rather than to the Commons, not least in its task of holding the executive to account. When a window of opportunity did emerge to secure effectiveness reforms, and even with the Modernisation Committee chairman leading the charge for such reforms, the partisan, executive-dominated institutional setting in which MPs operate ensured that such reforms were constrained. In the final analysis, the government needs the Modernisation Committee far more than does the House of Commons, and can mould it to its own ends better than it ever could using the Procedure Committee. So long as modernisation continues to be synonymous with the goal of fashioning the most efficient chamber possible, then the Modernisation Committee is likely to persist as a government-driven feature of the parliamentary landscape.
